A Framework for Provable Avoidance

JARRETT HUDDLESTON & ALEX MARDER

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Consider this traceroute

US

trace from 5a0-us.dpx to 202.28.17.129 TH 500 0.8

1 216.66.49.85

2 * 3 * 4 * e0-29.switch1.atl1.he.net US-1ms

| 5 | 184.104.197.110 | 45.4 | US | port-channel4.core3.lax2.he.net | US-1ms |
|----|-----------------|-------|----------|---|---------|
| 6 | 184.105.64.126 | 182.8 | Hk | 100ge0-62.core2.hkg1.he.net | HK-1ms |
| 7 | 65.49.108.78 | 183.1 | cisco Hk | cat-telecom-public-company-ltd.10gigabitethernet7-2.core1.hkg1.he.net | HK-1ms |
| 8 | 61.19.9.229 | 244.4 | cisco | | SG-31ms |
| 9 | 61.19.7.206 | 241.5 | cisco | | TH-5ms |
| 10 | 122.155.225.6 | 241.9 | cisco | | TH-4ms |
| 11 | * | | | | |
| 12 | 202.28.213.222 | 243.1 | cisco | | TH-5ms |
| 13 | * | | | | |

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•Use RTT from known vantage points to prove where a router *cannot* be



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- •Use RTT from known vantage points to prove where a router *cannot* be
- •Determine which countries a router cannot be in



Negative Geolocation

- •Use RTT from known vantage points to prove where a router *cannot* be
- •Determine which countries a router cannot be in
- •Only consider paths not starting or ending in a country



Data

- •CAIDA ITDK (Feb 2024)
 - Traceroutes over two weeks
 - RTT measurements
 - Hoiho geolocation
 - AS2Org
- •Additional geolocation for destination from the MaxMind GeoLite Country database
- •Natural Earth data for country borders

Limited by MPLS

•MPLS tunnels may hide routers

Limited by MPLS, Vantage Points

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•Distribution of vantage points creates bias

Limited by MPLS, Vantage Points, & RTTs

•MPLS tunnels may hide routers

•Distribution of vantage points creates bias

•High RTT measurements weaken estimates



The US and Europe are hardest to avoid



A map of how many paths do not provably avoid a country

Censorship states are easier to avoid

| Rank* | Country |
|-------|---------|
| 1 | China |
| 2 | Myanmar |
| 3 | Iran |
| 4 | Cuba |
| 5 | Russia |

*As reported by Freedom House's internet freedom scores

Censorship states are easier to avoid

| Rank* | Country | Paths Excluded |
|-------|---------|----------------|
| 1 | China | 9.84% |
| 2 | Myanmar | 0.01% |
| 3 | Iran | 0.35% |
| 4 | Cuba | 0.01% |
| 5 | Russia | 2.79% |

*As reported by Freedom House's internet censorship scores

Censorship states are easier to avoid

| Rank* | Country | Paths Excluded | % Provably Avoiding this Country |
|-------|---------|----------------|--|
| 1 | China | 9.84% | 80.12% |
| 2 | Myanmar | 0.01% | 92.42% |
| 3 | Iran | 0.35% | 86.49% |
| 4 | Cuba | 0.01% | 94.46% |
| 5 | Russia | 2.79% | 65.47% |

*As reported by Freedom House's internet censorship scores

Important Geopolitical Coalitions

| Name | % Provably Avoiding Coalition |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| BRICS | 54.41% |
| Five Eyes | 19.19% |
| NATO | 11.59% |
| Russia, China, & Iran | 66.16% |

Important Geopolitical Coalitions

| Name | % Provably Avoiding Coalition | Paths Excluded |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|
| BRICS | 54.41% | 20.43% |
| Five Eyes | 19.19% | 68.33% |
| NATO | 11.59% | 82.59% |
| Russia, China, & Iran | 66.16% | 12.84% |

ASes contribute little to avoidability



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•Integrate real time system with an overlay

Conclusions

•The US and Europe are the most difficult regions to provably avoid

•Current censorship countries are slightly easier to avoid

•Coalitions of countries can significantly increase difficulty to avoid

• With fewer paths to prove this

•Ases do not have a significant influence on most countries